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D. Guster† N. K. Krivulin‡§
Abstract
A model of computer system security operation is developed based
on the fork-join queueing network formalism. We introduce a security
operation performance measure, and show how it may be used to per-
formance evaluation of actual systems.
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1 Introduction
The explosive growth in computer systems and networks has increased the
role of computer security within organizations [1]. In many cases, ineffective
protection against computer security treats leads to considerable damage,
and even can cause an organization to be paralized. Therefore, the de-
velopment of new models and methods of performance analysis of security
systems seems to be very important.
In this paper, we propose a model of computer security operation, and
introduce its related performance measure. It is shown how the model can
be applied to performance evaluation of actual systems. Finally, a tech-
nique of security system performance analysis is described and its practical
implementation is discussed.
We conclude with an appendix which contains technical details concern-
ing fork-join network representation of the model, and related results.
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1
2 A Security Operation Model
In this paper, we deal with the current security activities (see Fig. 1) that
mainly relate to the actual security threats rather than to strategic or long-
term issues of security management.
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Figure 1: Computer systems security activities.
Consider the model of security operation in an organization, presented in
Fig. 2. Each operational cycle starts with security attack detection based on
audit records and system/errors log analysis, traffic analysis, or user reports.
In order to detect an intrusion, automated tools of security monitoring are
normally used including procedures of statistical anomaly detection, rule-
based detection, and data integrity control [1].
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Figure 2: A security analysis and maintenance model.
After security attack detection and identification, the integrity of sys-
tem/application software and data in storage devices has to be examined
to search for possible unauthorized modifications or damages made by the
intruder. The investigation procedure can exploit file lists and checksum
analysis, hash functions, and other automated techniques.
In parallel, the system vulnerabilities, which allow the intruder to attack,
should be identified and investigated. The vulnerability analysis normally
presents an informal procedure, and therefore, it can hardly be performed
automatically.
Based on the results of integrity analysis, a software and data recovery
procedure can be initiated using back-up servers and reserving storage de-
vices. It has to take into account the security vulnerabilities identified at
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the previous step, so as to provide for further improvements in the entire
security system.
Along with the recovery procedure, the development of a complete set of
countermeasures against similar attacks should be performed. Finally, the
operational cycle is concluded with appropriate modifications of software,
data bases, and system security policies and procedures.
We assume that the organization has appropriate personnel integrated in
a Computer Emergency Response Team, available to handle the attack. The
team would include at least two subteams working in parallel, one to perform
integrity analysis and recovery procedures, and another to do vulnerability
analysis and development of countermeasures. At any time instant, each
subteam can deal with only one security incident. Any procedure may be
started as soon as all prior procedures according to the model in Fig. 2,
have been completed. If a request to handle a new incident occurs when a
subteam is still working on a procedure, the request has to wait until the
processing of that procedure is completed.
We denote by τ1k a random variable (r.v.) that represents the time inter-
val between detections of the k th attack and its predecessor. Furthermore,
we introduce r.v.’s τik , i = 2, . . . , 6, to describe the time of the k th instant
of procedure i in the model. We assume τi1, τi2, . . . , to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) r.v.’s with finite mean and variance for each
i , i = 1, . . . , 6. At the same time, we do not require of independence of
τ1k, . . . , τ6k for each k , k = 1, 2, . . . .
3 Security Operation Performance Evaluation
In order to describe system performance, we introduce the following nota-
tions. Let TA be the mean time between consecutive security attacks (the
attack cycle time), and TS be the mean time required to completely handle
an attack (the recovery cycle time), as the number of attacks k tends to ∞ .
In devising the security operation performance measure, one can take
the ratio
R = T S/TA.
With the natural condition T S ≤ TA , one can consider R as the time
portion the system is under recovery, assuming k →∞ .
First note that the attack cycle time can immediately be evaluated as
the mean value: TA = E[τ11] .
Now consider the cycle time of the entire system, which can be defined
as the mean time interval between successive completions of security system
modification procedures as the number of attacks k →∞ . As one can prove
(see Appendix for further details), the system cycle time γ can be calculated
as
γ = max{E[τ11], . . . ,E[τ61]}.
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In order to evaluate the recovery cycle time, we assume the system will
operate under the maximum traffic level, which can be achieved when all the
time intervals between attacks are set to 0. Clearly, under that condition,
the system cycle time can be taken as a reasonable estimate of the recovery
cycle time.
Considering that now E[τ11] = 0, we get the recovery cycle time in the
form
T S = max{E[τ21], . . . ,E[τ61]}.
4 Performance Analysis and Discussion
In fact, the above model presents a quite simple but useful tool for security
system operation management. It may be used to make decision on the
basis of a few natural parameters of the security operation process.
Let us represent the ratio R in the form
R = max{E[τ21], . . . ,E[τ61]}/E[τ11],
and assume the attack rate determined by E[τ11] , to be fixed.
Taking into account that the above result has been obtained based on
the assumption of an infinite number of attacks, we arrive at the follow-
ing conclusion. As the number of attacks becomes sufficiently large, the
performance of the system is determined by the time of the longest proce-
dure involved in the system operation, whereas the impact of the order of
performing the procedures disappears.
It is clear that in order to improve system performance, the system
security manager (administrator) should first concentrate on decreasing the
mean time required to perform the longest procedure within the security
operation model, then consider the second longest procedure, and so on.
The goal of decreasing the time can be achieved through partition of a
whole procedure into subprocedures, which can be performed in parallel, or
through rescheduling of the entire process with redistribution of particular
activities between procedures.
In practice, the above model and its related ratio R can serve as the basis
for efficient monitorization of organizational security systems. Because the
introduction of new countermeasures may change the attack cycle time, the
monitoring requires updating this parameter after each modification of the
system.
Finally note, the above model can be easily extended to cover security
operational processes, which consist of different procedures and precedence
constraints.
4
Appendix
In order to describe the above security system operational model in a formal
way, we exploit the fork-join network formalism proposed in [2].
The fork-join networks present a class of queueing systems, which allow
for splitting a customer into several new customers at one node, and of merg-
ing customers into one at another node. In order to represent the dynamics
of such networks, we use a (max,+)-algebra based approach developed in
[3].
The (max,+)-algebra is a triple 〈Rε,⊕,⊗〉 , where Rε = R ∪ {ε} with
ε = −∞ . The operations ⊕ and ⊗ are defined for all x, y ∈ Rε as
x⊕ y = max(x, y), x⊗ y = x+ y.
The (max,+)-algebra of matrices is introduced in the ordinary way with
the matrix E with all its entries equal ε , taken as the null matrix, and
the matrix E = diag(0, . . . , 0) with its off-diagonal entries equal ε , as the
identity.
We introduce the vector x(k) = (x1(k), . . . , xn(k))
T as the k th ser-
vice completion times at the network nodes, and the diagonal matrix Tk =
diag(τ1k, . . . , τnk) with given nonnegative random variables τik representing
the k th service time at node i , i = 1, . . . , n , and the off-diagonal entries
equal ε .
The dynamics of acyclic fork-join networks can be described by the
stochastic difference equation (see [3] for further details)
x(k) = A(k)⊗ x(k − 1), A(k) =
p⊕
j=0
(Tk ⊗G
T )j ⊗ Tk, (1)
where G is a matrix with the elements
gij =
{
0, if there exists arc (i, j) in the network graph,
ε, otherwise,
and p is the length of the longest path in the graph.
The matrix G is normally referred to as the support matrix of the net-
work. Note that since the network graph is acyclic, we have Gq = E for all
q > p .
The cycle time of the network is defined as
γ = lim
k→∞
‖x(k)‖,
where ‖x(k)‖ = maxi xi(k). Clearly, if this limit exists, it can be found as
limk→∞ ‖Ak‖, where Ak = A(k)⊗ · · · ⊗A(1).
As it is easy to see, the fork-join network representation of the above
security operation model takes the form presented in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3: The fork-join queueing network model.
For the network graph, we have p = 3. Therefore, we get equation (1)
with A(k) = (E ⊕ Tk ⊗G
T ⊕ (Tk ⊗G
T )2)⊕ (Tk ⊗G
T )3)⊗ Tk .
Let us consider an arbitrary fork-join queueing network with n nodes,
which is governed by equation (1). We assume that the matrix G at (1)
has the upper triangular form. Since the network graph is acyclic, the
network nodes can always be renumbered so that the matrix G become
upper triangular.
Now we describe a tandem queueing system associated with the above
network. We assume the evolution of the tandem system to be governed by
the equation
x(k) = B(k)⊗ x(k − 1), B(k) =
n⊕
j=0
(Tk ⊗H
T )j ⊗ Tk,
where H is a support matrix with the elements
hij =
{
0, if i+ 1 = j,
ε, otherwise.
Note that both matrices A(k) and B(k) are determined by the common
matrix Tk , but different support matrices G and H . Clearly, the longest
path in the graph associated with the tandem queue is assumed to be equal
n .
Lemma 1. For all k = 1, 2, . . . , it holds that A(k) ≤ B(k).
Proof: As it is easy to verify, for any integer q > 0, it holds
Gq ≤ H ⊕H2 ⊕ · · · ⊕Hn.
Furthermore, since Tk has only nonnegative entries on the diagonal, we
have for any q > 1,
Hq ⊗ Tk ≤ (H ⊗ Tk)
q.
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By applying the above inequalities together with the condition that
Hm = E for all m > n , we arrive at the inequality
(G⊗ Tk)
q ≤ (H ⊗ Tk)⊕ (H ⊗ Tk)
2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ (H ⊗ Tk)
n.
Taking into account that the last inequality is valid for all q > 0, we
have
Tk ⊗
p⊕
j=0
(G⊗ Tk)
j ≤ Tk ⊗
n⊕
j=0
(H ⊗ Tk)
j .
It remains to transpose the both side of the inequality to get the desired
result.
By applying the above lemma together with the result in [4], one can
prove the following statement.
Lemma 2. Suppose that for the acyclic fork-join queueing network, the
random variables τi1, τi2, . . . , are i.i.d. for each i = 1, . . . , n with finite mean
E[τi1] ≥ 0 and variance D[τi1]. Then the cycle time γ can be evaluated as
γ = max{E[τ11], . . . ,E[τn1]}.
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